

# Classical Labor Supply with Micro Data

ECON 34430: Topics in Labor Markets

T. Lamadon (U of Chicago)

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# What is labor supply?



- Goal seems simple, how do individuals **choose to work** when **conditions change** ?
  - Yet it is a very complicated object.
- ① It tends to be highly heterogeneous across people
  - already by observables (gender, education, age, ...)
  - but also unobservables such as wealth, ability, ....
- ② Within individual:
  - "changes in conditions" can be high-dimensional (change in full tax schedule)
  - working can have path dependence (search frictions / human capital accumulation)
- ③ Identification measurement is difficult
  - participation/selection censors wage observations
  - observed quantities are outcome of supply/demand equilibrium

# The elasticities of interest:

- At some level, classical labor supply can be summarized by 4 major elasticities (Chetty, 2005)
- 2 available margins:
  - **extensive**: work or stay at home
  - **intensive**: how many hours to work
- 2 time horizons:
  - **permanent**: how do workers adjust to permanent wage/tax changes
  - **inter-temporal (or Frisch)**: how do workers substitute between period when relative prices change?



# Motivating examples:



## The elasticities of interest:

- Macro is concerned mainly with business cycle fluctuations and aggregate hours, it is then interested in both margins, and mostly in inter-temporal decisions.
- Optimal taxation is concerned with steady state equilibrium, permanent shifts will mainly be interested in long-term elasticities.
- Yet, all margins of adjustment might affect the outcome of a policy if:
  - taxes are age specific
  - the extensive margin is important (for female for instance)

## Take simple two period model:

- First I want to focus mainly on the study of the intensive margin, subject of most of the early empirical literature.
- The plan:
  - ① revisit the static and dynamics model and define elasticities
  - ② consider the effect of changes in elasticities on a ridiculously simple optimal taxation problems
  - ③ follow MaCurdy (1982); Altonji (1986) and derive estimating equation for the different elasticities
  - ④ consider possible extensions (Pistaferri, 2003), review broad results on elasticities



## Simple Static Model

- consider a linear utility function ( $\gamma \geq 0, \eta \leq 0$ ):

$$U(c, h) = \frac{c^{1+\eta}}{1+\eta} - \beta \frac{h^{1+\gamma}}{1+\gamma} + Q$$

- and simple budget constraint:

$$c = w(1 - \tau)h + N + R$$

- $N$  is non labor income (includes changes in saving decisions)
- $\tau$  is tax,  $Q$  is financed public good,  $R$  is lump-sum payment (for most of the analysis we can bundle  $R$  into  $N$ )
- think of this static model as a dynamic model where we want to make some comparative static (because changes affect all periods, no inter-temporal considerations)



# FOC and elasticities 1

- MRS gives:

$$\frac{MUL(h)}{MUC(h)} = \frac{\beta_t h_t^\gamma}{[w_t h_t (1 - \tau) + N_t]^\eta} = w_t (1 - \tau)$$

- define  $S$  as the share of earned income to total income

$$S = \frac{w_t h_t (1 - \tau)}{w_t h_t (1 - \tau) + N_t}$$





## FOC and elasticities 2

- The Marshallian, uncompensated elasticity is defined as:

$$e = \left. \frac{\partial \ln h_{it}}{\partial \ln w_{it}} \right|_{N_{it}} = \frac{1 + \eta \cdot S}{\gamma - \eta \cdot S}$$

- the Hicksian compensated elasticity is given by:

$$e_H = \left. \frac{\partial \ln h_{it}}{\partial \ln w_{it}} \right|_U = \frac{1}{\gamma - \eta \cdot S}$$

- the Income elasticity, or income effect:

$$ie = \left. \frac{\partial \ln h_{it}}{\partial \ln N_{it}} \right|_{w_{it}} = \frac{\eta \cdot (1 - S)}{\gamma - \eta \cdot S}$$

- Remember that:

$$e_M = e_H + ie$$



# Effect of simple policy 1

- Effect of increasing taxes, while redistributing through public good  $Q$
- $Q$  enters additively and so does not affect decision
- $h$  will respond according to  $e$
- The relevant measure is the **Marshallian** demand



## Effect of simple policy 2

- Effect of increasing taxes, while redistributing through lump sum  $R$
- The tax decreases incentive to work through
  - higher marginal rate
  - higher non-earned income.
- because the policy affects both  $\tau$  and  $R$
- The relevant measure is the **Hicksian** demand
- It appears that the literature has mostly focused on the **Hicksian** elasticity



## Quantifying the size of these Elasticities

- Evaluate the sensitivity of policy analysis to  $e$
- Consider a revenue maximizing policy when

$$h = [w(1 - \tau)]^e$$

- What is the value of  $\tau$  that maximizes revenue?

$$R = (wh)\tau = w [w(1 - \tau)]^e \cdot \tau$$

- for which the optimal tax rate is:

$$\tau^* = \frac{1}{1 + e}$$

- what does this mean for different values of  $e$  ?



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TABLE 2  
REVENUE MAXIMIZING FLAT TAX RATES GIVEN DIFFERENT LABOR SUPPLY ELASTICITIES

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Elasticity ( $e$ )	Optimal tax rate ( $\tau$ )	
	$g = 0$	$g = 0.5$
2.0	33%	20%
1.0	50%	33%
0.67	60%	43%
0.5	67%	50%
0.3	77%	63%
0.2	83%	71%
0.1	91%	83%
0.0	100%	100%

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


Figure 5. Distribution of Hicks Elasticity of Substitution Estimates

## Quantifying the size of these Elasticities

- The value of the elasticity affects enormously the tax choice in this simple setting!
- The literature reports an important range of values
- The public finance literature has settled on using values close to 0 for taxation purposes of high income



## What about inter-temporal decisions: Frisch elasticities

- We can augment the model to 2 periods:

$$\sup_{c_i, h_i, b} U_1(c_1, h_1) + \rho U_2(c_2, h_2)$$

$$\text{s.t. } c_1 = w_1(1 - \tau_1)h_1 + N_1 + b$$

$$c_2 = w_2(1 - \tau_2)h_2 + N_2 - (1 + r)b$$

- where  $b$  is borrowing,  $r$  the interest rate and  $\rho$  the time preference
- Reworking the equations gives:

$$\ln \frac{h_2}{h_1} = \frac{1}{\gamma} \left[ \ln \frac{w_2(1 - \tau_2)}{w_1(1 - \tau_1)} - \ln \rho(1 + r) - \ln \frac{\beta_2}{\beta_1} \right]$$

- this will be important for
  - responses to transitory shocks (Macro for instance)
  - taxation that forces time reallocation (pensions for instance)



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## Relationship between elasticities

- $\frac{1}{\gamma}$  is referred to as the **Frisch elasticity**  $e_F$
- Note that given  $S > 0$ ,  $\eta < 0$  and  $\gamma > 0$  we get

$$\frac{1}{\gamma} > \frac{1}{\gamma - \eta \cdot S} > \frac{1 + \eta \cdot S}{\gamma - \eta \cdot S}$$

- or that

$$e_F > e_H > e_H$$

## Estimation of the static model

- based on specifying the following equation:

$$\ln h_{it} = \beta + e \ln w_{it}(t - \tau_t) + \beta_l N_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$$

- the regression controls for non-labor income  $N_{it}$
- $\epsilon_{it}$  is interpreted as a supply shock
- $e$  delivers directly the Marshallian elasticity
- $\beta_l$  delivers the  $ie = w_{it}(1 - \tau)\beta_l$
- Finally the Hicksian elasticity is given by  $e_h = e - ie$



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# Estimation of the static model - limitations

- ① endogeneity of wage and non labor income
- ② endogeneity due to simultaneity
- ③ treatment of taxes
- ④ measurement error
- ⑤ participation margin ( do not observe wages for unemployed)
- ⑥ dynamic consideration like saving, human capital

see Keane (2011) for overview



# Male labor supply - static model - Keane review

TABLE 6  
SUMMARY OF ELASTICITY ESTIMATES FOR MALES

Authors of study	Year	Marshall	Hicks	Frisch
<i>Static models</i>				
Kosters	1969	-0.09	0.05	
Ashenfelter-Heckman	1973	-0.16	0.11	
Boskin	1973	-0.07	0.10	
Hall	1973	n/a	0.45	
Eight British studies <sup>a</sup>	1976-83	-0.16	0.13	
Eight NIT studies <sup>a</sup>	1977-84	0.03	0.13	
Burtless-Hausman	1978	0.00	0.07-0.13	
Wales-Woodland	1979	0.14	0.84	
Hausman	1981	0.00	0.74	
Blomquist	1983	0.08	0.11	
Blomquist-Hansson-Busewitz	1990	0.12	0.13	
MaCurdy-Green-Paarsch	1990	0.00	0.07	
Triest	1990	0.05	0.05	
Van Soest-Woittiez-Kapteyn	1990	0.19	0.28	
Ecklof-Sacklen	2000	0.05	0.27	
Blomquist-Ecklof-Newey	2001	0.08	0.09	

# Estimating Dynamic Labor Supply

- follow MaCurdy (1982); Altonji (1986)
- we take the life cycle model over many periods:

$$U_t(c, h) = \frac{c^{1+\eta}}{1+\eta} - \beta_t \frac{h^{1+\gamma}}{1+\gamma}$$

$$c_t = w_t(1 - \tau_t)h_t + N_t + b_t - (1 + r)b_t$$

- where the first order condition gives us

$$\frac{\beta_t h_t^\gamma}{[w_t(1 - \tau_t)h_t + N_t + b_t]^\eta} = \frac{\beta_t h_t^\gamma}{c_t^\eta} = w_t(1 - \tau_t)$$

# Estimating Dynamic Labor Supply - MaCurdy Method 1

- MaCurdy (1982) proposes to use the expression directly by introducing a taste shifter:

$$\beta_{it} = \exp(X_{it}\alpha - \epsilon_{it})$$

- this results in the following equation:

$$\ln w_{it}(1 - \tau_{it}) = \gamma \ln h_{it} - \eta \ln c_{it} + X_{it}\alpha - \epsilon_{it}$$

- this reflects the optimality in the choices of hours
- all variables are correlated and endogenous.
- Note that the method does not need a panel dimension





# Estimating Dynamic Labor Supply - MaCurdy Method 1

- MaCurdy (1982) proposes to use IV approach to estimate this equation
- he uses for  $X_{it}$ : number of children and race
- he uses for the instruments: education interacted with age polynomial
  - the hump shape of wages and hours guarantees explanatory power
  - the exogeneity of age and education with respect  $\epsilon_{it}$  is a strong restriction

• the paper reports  $\gamma = 0.16$  and  $\eta = -0.66$

• using our past formula, ignoring non-labor income, we get:

$$e_M = 0.42, \quad e_H = 1.22, \quad ie = -0.80, \quad e_F = 6.25$$

• this values appear larger than for static models



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## Estimating Dynamic Labor Supply - Altonji

- Altonji (1986) rewrites this equation to

$$\ln h_{it} = \frac{1}{\gamma} \ln w_{it}(1 - \tau_{it}) + \frac{\eta}{\gamma} \ln c_{it} - X_{it} \frac{\alpha}{\gamma} + \frac{\epsilon_{it}}{\gamma}$$

- he uses for  $X_{it}$ : number of children, race, region, year dummies
- for the instruments
  - defines  $w$  as ratio of earnings to hours
  - for the instrument, uses direct question on wage in the survey
  - supplement with a second instrument that measures "permanent wage"

## Estimating Dynamic Labor Supply - Altonji

- Altonji (1986) reports  $\gamma = 5.81$  and  $\eta = -3.10$   
(  $1/\gamma = 0.172(0.119)$  and  $\eta/\gamma = -0.534(0.386)$  )
- using our past formula, ignoring non-labor income, we get:

$$e_M = -0.24, \quad e_H = 0.11, \quad ie = -0.35, \quad e_F = 0.17$$

- this values are quite different from MaCurdy

$$e_M = 0.42, \quad e_H = 1.22, \quad ie = -0.80, \quad e_F = 6.25$$

- Keane (2011) reports that no replication study has been able to reconcile these findings!

## Directly measuring the Frisch Elasticity - MaCurdy

- MaCurdy also proposes a method to measure the Frisch elasticity directly
- recall the intertemporal decision

$$\frac{\beta_t h_t^\gamma}{c_t^\eta} = w_t(1 - \tau_t)$$

- and the Euler equation under uncertainty

$$c_t^\eta = E_t \rho(1 + r_{t+1} c_{t+1}^\eta)$$

- rewrite in logs with unexpected shock  $\xi_t$

$$\eta \Delta \ln c_t = -\ln \rho(1 + r_{t+1}) + \xi_t$$

- we take log-differences, substitute in the taste shifter

$\beta_{it} = \exp(X_{it}\alpha - \epsilon_{it})$  to get:

$$\Delta \ln h_{it} = \frac{1}{\gamma} \Delta \ln w_{it}(1 - \tau_{it}) - \frac{1}{\gamma} \rho(1 + r_t) - \frac{\alpha}{\gamma} \Delta X_{it} + \frac{1}{\gamma} \xi_{it} + \frac{1}{\gamma} \Delta \epsilon_{it}$$



## Directly measuring the Frisch Elasticity - MaCurdy

- this allows to not rely on consumption data
- the error term is composed of 2 components and
  - $\xi_{it}$ : the surprise change in marginal utility of consumption
  - $\Delta\epsilon_{it}$ : change in taste of work
- MaCurdy assumes perfect foresight
  - the instrument is the deviation from predicted wage growth
  - in practice first stage regresses wage growth on set of observables
- wages are not adjusted for taxes
- the paper reports a Frisch elasticity of 0.15(0.98)
- using our past formula, ignoring non-labor income, we get:

$$e_M = 0.42, \quad e_H = 1.22, \quad ie = -0.80, \quad e_F = 6.25$$



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## Estimating Frisch directly - Pistaferri

- Pistaferri (2003) proposes to use subjective expectations to differentiate expected from unexpected wage gains
- uses data from Italy which contains information about individual expectations about their earning growth
- Pistaferri modifies the previous expression to contain observed expected and unexpected wage growth
- the paper finds a Frisch elasticity of  $0.704(0.093)$  and an income effect of  $-0.199(0.091)$
- and reports that a 5% increase in hours to a 10% increase in permanent wages (this was 0.8 in MaCurdy)



## Estimating Frisch directly - Pistaferri

- important caveats to keep in mind:
- the period considered by the paper includes recession in Italy in 1993
- the data is from Italy (would expect to go the other way)
- surveyed expectations are about earnings, not wages



# Male labor supply - dynamic - Keane review

TABLE 6  
SUMMARY OF ELASTICITY ESTIMATES FOR MALES

Authors of study	Year	Marshall	Hicks	Frisch
<i>Dynamic models</i>				
MaCurdy	1981	0.08 <sup>b</sup>		0.15
MaCurdy	1983	0.70	1.22	6.25
Browning-Deaton-Irish	1985			0.09
Blundell-Walker	1986	-0.07	0.02	0.03
Altonji <sup>c</sup>	1986	-0.24	0.11	0.17
Altonji <sup>d</sup>	1986			0.31
Altug-Miller	1990			0.14
Angrist	1991			0.63
Ziliak-Kniesner	1999	0.12	0.13	0.16
Pistaferri	2003	0.51 <sup>b</sup>		0.70
Imai-Keane	2004	0.40 <sup>e</sup>	1.32 <sup>e</sup>	0.30-2.75 <sup>f</sup>
Ziliak-Kniesner	2005	-0.47	0.33	0.54
Aaronson-French	2009			0.16-0.61
Average		0.06	0.31	0.85

# Extensions

- progressive taxation (Ziliak and Kniesner, 1999)
- Non-separable preferences (Ziliak and Kniesner, 2005)
- Family labor supply (we will cover this in the next course topic on consumption smoothing)
- adding human capital (Heckman)
- tied wage-hours offers (Aaronson and French 2009)
- other important sets of papers:
  - fully structural approach
  - fully experimental or quasi experimental (kinks...)
  - female labor supply



## Non separable preferences

- Ziliak and Kniesner (2005) proposes to change preferences to

$$U(c, h) = G\left(\frac{c^{1+\eta}}{1+\eta} - \beta \frac{h^{1+\gamma}}{1+\gamma}\right)$$

- with  $G(x) = (1 + \sigma)^{-1} x^{1+\sigma}$
- simulate the effect of changing  $\sigma$  on resulting Frisch estimate
- as  $\sigma \rightarrow -\infty$ , consumer cares about minimizing the min value, Frisch  $\rightarrow 1$



TABLE 4  
HOW FRISCH ELASTICITY VARIES WITH WILLINGNESS TO SUBSTITUTE UTILITY OVER TIME

$\sigma$	Frisch elasticity	Changes in hours		Changes in consumption		Changes in utility	
		Hours(1)	Hours(2)	C(1)	C(2)	G(X(1))	G(X(2))
0.0	2.00	+1.03%	-0.96%	+0.97%	+0.97%	-0.05%	+1.44%
-0.5	1.40	+0.82%	-0.58%	+1.18%	+0.58%	+0.27%	+0.87%
-1.0	1.25	+0.76%	-0.48%	+1.24%	+0.48%	+0.38%	+0.72%
-2.0	1.14	+0.73%	-0.41%	+1.27%	+0.42%	+0.41%	+0.62%
-5.0	1.06	+0.70%	-0.36%	+1.30%	+0.36%	+0.45%	+0.54%
-10.0	1.03	+0.69%	-0.34%	+1.31%	+0.34%	+0.46%	+0.51%
-40.0	1.01	+0.68%	-0.33%	+1.32%	+0.33%	+0.48%	+0.49%

# Table of content

Main

Supplements



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